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Abstract	
	
Global	Administrative	Law	is	the	branch	of	Global	Governance	that	seeks	to	provide	
guidance	 and	 structures	 for	 decision‐making	 bodies	 and	 international	
organisations	that	rely	on	co‐operation	between	a	range	of	international	actors	to	
achieve	various	objectives	or	 implement	policy	agendas.	 	In	2006,	Michael	S.	Barr	
and	 Geoffrey	 P.	 Miller	 critically	 analysed	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	
Supervision.		Their	article	Global	Administrative	Law:	The	View	from	Basel	sought	
to	dispel	the	critiques	that	 international‐law	making	processes	 lacked	democratic	
accountability	and	oversight	by	offering	the	Basel	Committee’s	own	processes	as	a	
model	for	international	law‐making	with	greater	accountability	and	legitimacy.	
	
This	article	examines	the	Basel	Committee	since	Barr	and	Miller’s	2006	article,	 in	
light	of	the	global	financial	crisis	and	the	development	of	‘Basel	III’.		It	will	seek	to	
determine	 whether	 the	 processes	 described	 by	 Barr	 and	 Miller	 proved	 to	 be	
effective,	and	if	Global	Administrative	Legal	theory	is	appropriately	applied	to	the	
Basel	 Committee.	 Finally,	 the	 article	will	 ask	whether	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 still	
serves	as	a	model	 for	 international	 law‐making	with	 greater	accountability	and	
legitimacy,	or	if	more	work	is	needed	to	fulfil	this	model.	
	
	
Word	Count	
	
The	 total	 word	 count	 of	 this	 paper	 (excluding	 abstract	 and	 footnotes)	 is	
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I. INTRODUCTION	
	
With	 the	 growth	 of	 globalisation,	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 organisations	 and	
networks	have	been	established	to	regulate	and	control	activity	on	a	global	scale.			
Whatever	 view	 is	 held	 about	 the	 place	 of	 globalisation,	 whether	 it	 widens	 or	
narrows	the	gap	between	the	developed	and	developing	word,	a	central	question	
remains.	 	 As	 the	 world	 becomes	 increasingly	 connected,	 “[t]he	 role	 of	 law	 in	
development	has	become	a	key	focus[.]”1		One	way	that	has	been	put	forward	to	
manage	this	development	is	through	Global	Administrative	Law.			
	
Global	Administrative	Law	helps	to	describe	the	principles	that	could	apply	to	a	
number	 of	 organisations	 operating	 in	 the	 international	 legal	 environment.		
Specifically,	 for	 this	 article’s	 purpose,	 it	 relates	 to	 “the	 structures,	 procedures,	
and	normative	standards	of	regulatory	decision‐making	…	that	are	applicable	to	
formal	 intergovernmental	 regulatory	 bodies	 [and]	 informal	 intergovernmental	
regulatory	networks[.]”2	
	
Barr	and	Miller,	in	“Global	Administrative	Law:	The	View	from	Basel”	pointed	out	
the	perception	that	“the	Basel	Committee	is	perhaps	the	most	important	example	
of	 a	 transgovernmental	 regulatory	 network	 that	 exercises	 vast	 powers,	
seemingly	 without	 any	 form	 of	 democratic	 accountability.”3		 Barr	 and	 Miller	
suggested	 that	 this	 view	 is	 not	 strictly	 true.	 	 	 They	 suggest	 that,	 upon	 closer	
examination,	 “a	 structure	 of	 global	 administrative	 law	 inherent	 in	 the	 Basel	
process	 ...	 could	 be	 a	 model	 for	 international	 rule‐making	 with	 greater	
accountability	and	 legitimacy.”4		This	paper	will	pick	up	where	Barr	and	Miller	
left	 off.	 	 It	 will	 examine	 whether	 the	 structures	 and	 processes	 described	 as	
representing	a	model	of	global	administrative	law	could	reasonably	described	as	
such.	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 will	 examine	 how	 global	 administrative	 legal	 processes	
have	affected	the	implementation	and	development	of	Basel	III.	Finally,	it	will	ask	
what	more	could	the	Basel	Committee	do	to	 implement	the	principles	of	global	
administrative	law.	
	
II. GLOBAL	 ADMINISTRATIVE	 LAW	 –	 GUIDING	 PRINCIPLES	 FOR	
INTERNATIONAL	ORGANISATIONS	
	
To	 understand	 the	 ways	 that	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 represents	 global	
administrative	 law	 in	action,	 it	 is	necessary	to	describe	what	constitutes	global	
administrative	 law	 and	 why	 it	 is	 of	 vital	 importance	 for	 an	 organisation	 that	
exercises	 governance	 responsibilities	 on	 the	 international	 stage.	 Kingsbury	 et	
alia	 succinctly	 describe	 the	 core	 concepts	 of	 global	 administrative	 law.		
Kingsbury	 states	 that	 “[t]he	 concept	 of	Global	Administrative	Law	begins	 from	
the	 twin	 ideas	 that	 much	 global	 governance	 can	 be	 understood	 as	
																																																								
1	 Michael	Barr	&	Reuven	Avi‐Yonah	“Globalization,	Law	&	Development:	Introduction	and	
Overview”	(2004‐05)	Mich.	J.	Int’l	L.	26	1	at	2.	
2	 Benedict	Kingsbury	et	alia	“The	Emergence	of	Global	Administrative	Law”	(2005)	68	
Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	15	at		
3	 Michael	Barr	&	Geoffrey	Miller	“Global	Administrative	Law:	The	View	from	Basel”	(2006)	
EJIL	17	1	at	17.	
4	 Ibid.	
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administration,	 and	 that	 such	administration	 is	 often	organized	and	 shaped	by	
principles	of	an	administrative	law	character.”5		Governance	at	the	international	
level	is	rapidly	changing	and	evolving	as	a	result	of	the	increase	in	the	variety	of	
networks	 that	 exercise	 governance,	 leadership,	 and	 agenda	 setting	
responsibilities	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 	 The	 variety	 of	 organisations	 and	
networks	 include	 regulation‐by‐non‐regulation,	 formal	 self‐regulation,	 private‐
public	 regulation,	 governance	networks	 led	by	 state	officials,	 and	official	 inter‐
governmental	networks	with	direct	governance	powers.		
	
Global	Governance,	 and	Global	Administrative	Law	particularly	are	 required	 to	
not	only	ensure	uniform	application	of	policy	decisions	by	 international	actors,	
but	also	that	decisions	are	reached	in	fair	and	transparent	way.		Kingsbury	et	alia	
acknowledge	that	as	global	regulators	gained	 increasing	power	with	significant	
impact	 upon	 a	 range	 of	 other	 actors,	 questions	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 democratic	
accountability	 surfaced.	 Global	 Administrative	 Law	 seeks	 to	 address	 these	
questions	by	encompassing:		
“legal	mechanisms,	 principles,	 and	practices	…	 that	 promote	 or	 otherwise	affect	 the	
accountability	 of	 global	 administrative	 bodies	 …	 by	 ensuring	 these	 bodies	 meet	
adequate	 standards	 of	 transparency,	 consultation,	 participation,	 rationality,	 and	
legality,	 and	 by	 providing	 effective	 review	 of	 the	 rules	 and	 decisions	 these	 bodies	
make.”6	
An	 important	 distinction	 to	 make	 is	 that	 Global	 Governance	 includes	 actors,	
processes,	 and	 legal	 norms	 that	 are	 not	 simply	 confined	 to	 the	 traditional	
understanding	 of	 international	 law.	 	 Global	 governance	 encompasses	 actors	 at	
both	 international	 and	 domestic	 level,	 and	 this	 is	 why	 neither	 traditional	
international	 or	 domestic	 legal	 mechanisms	 provide	 effective	 regulatory	 and	
administrative	processes.	
	
Domestic	 administrative	 law	 is	 a	 well‐established	 concept	 regulating	 the	
exercise	 of	 executive	 power	 by	 government	 officials.	 	 	 Put	 simply,	 global	
governance	 “is	 the	 very	 same	 has	 national	 governance,	 but	 it	 has	 to	 work	 on	
global	 level” 7 	On	 this	 interpretation,	 reasoning	 by	 analogy,	 domestic	
administrative	 legal	 processes	 of	 advance	 democracies	 arguably	 provides	 the	
model	 to	 applied	 to	 international	 rule‐making	 bodies.	 	 With	 the	 increase	 in	
international	 organisations	 exercising	 regulatory	 activities,	 “the	 traditionally	
bright	line	distinctions	between	public/private	and	national/international	in	the	
global	administrative	space”8	have	been	blurred.		To	counter	this	blurring	effect	
to	maintain	a	sense	of	order,	core	principles	of	global	administrative	law	emerge.			
	
Core	 principles	 of	 global	 administrative	 law	 include	 “both	 classical	
administrative	 law	 conceptions	 of	 fair	 and	 legal	 decision‐making	 and	 review	
procedures,	 and	 also	 more	 substantive	 …	 ‘public	 law’	 or	 ‘good	 governance’	
																																																								
5	 Benedict	Kingsbury	et	alia	“Forward:	Global	Governance	as	Administration:	National	and	
Transnational	Approaches	to	Global	Administrative	Law”	(2005)	Law	and	Contemporary	
Problems	68	3/4	at	2.	
6		 Ibid	at	5.	
7		 János	Hoós	Global	Governance	‐	Global	Governance	and	Global	Political	Stability	‐	Need	for	
Global	Governance	and	chance	of	its	Development	(ed,	Akadémiai	Kiadó,	Budapest,	2006)	at	112.	
8	 Andrew	Mitchell	&	John	Farnik	“Global	Administrative	Law:	Can	it	bring	Global	
Governance	to	account?”	(2009)	Federal	Law	Review	37	237,	at	244.	
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values.”	9		Throughout	this	paper,	the	working	conception	and	standard	that	will	
be	 applied	 is	 that	 set	 out	 by	 Kingsbury,	 Krisch	 and	 Stewart.	 	 Global	
administrative	 law	 “covers	 all	 the	 rules	 and	 procedures	 that	 help	 ensure	 the	
accountability	 of	 global	 administration,	 and	 it	 focuses	 in	 particular	 on	
administrative	 structures,	 on	 transparency,	 on	 participatory	 elements	 in	 the	
administrative	 procedure,	 on	 principles	 of	 reasoned	 decision‐making	 and	 on	
mechanisms	 of	 review.”10		 These	 factors	 of	 (1)	 administrative	 structures,	 (2)	
transparency,	 (3)	 participatory	 elements	 in	 the	 procedural	 process,	 (4)	
principles	of	reasoned	decision‐making	and	(5)	mechanisms	of	review	form	the	
basis	of	the	papers	analysis	into	how	effective	the	Basel	Committee	incorporates	
and	 utilises	 global	 administrative	 law	 in	 its	 own	 governing	 and	 regulatory	
processes.	
	
III. A	POSTCARD	FROM	BASEL:	BARR	AND	MILLERS	VIEW	
	
Global	Administrative	Law:	The	View	from	Basel	analyses	the	ways	that	the	Basel	
Committee	 provides	 a	 model	 for	 international	 law	 making	 with	 greater	
accountability	 and	 legitimacy	 while	 attempting	 to	 dispel	 the	 commonly‐held	
perception	 that	 international	 decision‐making	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	
Committee	lack	democratic	accountability	and	legitimacy.		The	Basel	Committee	
provides	an	effective	example	of	global	administrative	law	in	action	because	both	
critics	 and	 supports	 of	 its	 processes	 can	 point	 to	 instances	 of	 either	 open	 and	
transparent	processes,	or	closed‐door	secrecy.	
	
Barr	and	Miller	point	to	the	ways	that	run	counter	to	the	claims	of	legitimacy	and	
accountability	 of	 the	Basel	 Committee,	 before	 highlighting	why	 these	 concerns	
are	overstated.		Their	article	goes	through	the	criticisms	including	the	claim	that	
the	 Basel	 Committee	 is	 a	 Central	 Bankers’	 Club,	 “small,	 homogeneous,	 and	
insular.” 11 	Specifically,	 that	 it	 insulated	 from	 any	 true	 from	 of	 political	
accountability	 for	 the	 decisions	 that	 it	 makes.	 	 A	 major	 critique	 of	 the	 Basel	
Committee	is	that	because	it	“operates	in	many	respects	as	an	informal	club,	[its]	
activities	 …	may	 be	 opaque	 and	 difficult	 to	 explain	…	 [and	 this]	 informality	 ...	
serves	 to	diminish	 transparency	and	may	 increase	 the	potential	 for	 capture	by	
special	interests[.]”12		However,	Barr	and	Miller	work	to	highlight	the	ways	that	
the	Basel	process	promotes	accountability	and	legitimacy.			This	paper’s	purpose	
is	to	pick	up	where	Barr	and	Miller	 left	off.	 	Almost	10	years	have	passed	since	
The	View	 from	Basel	was	 published.	 	 Many	 developments,	 including	 the	 Global	
Financial	 Crisis	 served	 as	 crucial	 tests	 for	 the	 Basel	 Committee.	 	 With	 the	
development	of	the	next	Basel	accord	(known	as	Basel	III)	 ‐	 it	 is	time	to	revisit	
the	Basel	Committee	to	question	whether	it	still	remains	a	model	for	the	global	
administrative	 legal	 processes,	 or	 whether	 necessity	 for	 efficient	 decision‐
making	processes	meant	some	of	the	crucial	aspects	of	global	administrative	law	
have	been	neglected.		
	
																																																								
9		 Ibid	at	245.	
10		 Benedict	Kingsbury,	Nico	Krisch	&	Richard	Stewart	“The	Emergence	of	Global	
Administrative	Law”	(2005)	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	68	3/4	at	28.	
11	 Above,	n	3	at	18.	
12		 Above,	n	3	at	19.	
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IV. FROM	BASEL	I	TO	III.	
	
As	 more	 countries	 deregulated	 banking	 and	 financial	 services,	 the	 Basel	
Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	was	formed	in	1975	to	appropriately	advise	
national	financial	regulators	on	common	capital	requirements	for	internationally	
active	banks.	 	The	Committee	was	established	by	the	central	bank	governors	of	
the	 G10	 countries,	 (now	 G20)	 with	 its	 aim	 “to	 enhance	 financial	 stability	 by	
improving	 supervisory	 knowhow	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 banking	 supervision	
worldwide.”13		Crucially,	any	decision	of	the	Committee	has	no	legal	 force	upon	
its	 members.	 	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 binding	 legal	 authority,	 the	 supervisory	
standards	and	guidelines	that	it	does	recommend	are	done	so	in	the	expectation	
that	 individual	 national	 authorities	 will	 implement	 them,	 which	 then	 become	
binding.	
	
The	Basel	Committee	implemented	Basel	I	in	response	to	the	common	practice	of	
banks	 lending	 significantly	 more	 than	 their	 deposit	 bases.	 	 Regulation	 was	
determined	necessary	to	 lessen	the	 impact	of	any	 losses	that	may	be	sustained	
by	 banks	 when	 “the	 precariousness	 of	 the	 mismatch	 [between	 lending	 and	
deposits]	is	exacerbated	by	defaulting	borrowers	or	sharp	declines	in	the	quality	
of	 asset	 portfolios.”14		 Basel	 I	 was	 comprised	 of	 three	 main	 parts.	 Firstly,	 the	
Committee	 standardised	 the	 minimum	 regulatory	 ratio	 for	 banks	 that	 were	
internationally	 active.	 Secondly,	 the	 Committee	 defined	 regulatory	 capital.		
Regulatory	 capital	 was	 divided	 into	 two	 tiers.	 	 “Tier	 1	 capital	 generally	
represents	the	highest	quality	of	capital,	such	as	common	equity	and	some	types	
of	 preferred	 stock.”15		 Tier	 2	 was	 made	 up	 of	 lower‐quality	 instruments,	
including	 “subordinated	 term	 debt	 and	 hybrid	 instruments.”16		 Finally	 the	
Committee	put	in	place	a	process	for	banks	to	calculate	their	regulatory	capital	
ratios.			
	
Since	 implementation,	 Basel	 I	 faced	 criticism	 and	 debate	 by	 commentators,	
which	led	the	introduction	of	Basel	II.		Basel	II’s	development	was	“driven	by	the	
ongoing	explosive	growth	in	the	financial	market	activities	of	banks	and	exciting	
developments	in	risk	management	practices.”17		In	his	article,	Kevin	Davis	argues	
that	Basel	 II	 should	be	viewed	as	a	way	 to	help	 improve	 the	 risk	management	
practices	of	the	banking	sector.		To	improve	on	Basel	I,	Basel	II	was	‘built’	around	
what	have	been	described	as	pillars.		These	three	pillars	were	“minimum	capital	
requirements,	 the	 supervisory	 review	 process,	 and	 market	 discipline.”18		 The	
emphasis	of	both	Basel	I	and	Basel	II	was	to	enhance	risk	management	by	Banks	
to	 insulate	 them	should	a	 crisis	emerge.	 	The	global	 financial	 crisis	highlighted	
the	 deficiencies	 in	 Basel	 II,	 but	 emphasised	 the	 continued	 need	 for	 the	 Basel	
Committee	and	its	processes.		
																																																								
13		 Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	“A	brief	history	of	the	Basel	Committee”	
(October	2014)	<	http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf>	at	1.	
14	 Peter	King	and	Heath	Tarbert	“Basel	III:	An	Overview”	(2011)	Banking	&	Financial	
Services	Policy	Report,	30	5	at	1.		
15		 Ibid	at	2.	
16		 Ibid.	
17		 Kevin	Davis	“Basel	III”	(2005)	Banking	and	Financial	Services,	at	8.	
18		 Above	n	14	at	2.		
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The	next	iteration	of	the	Basel	regulatory	standards	brings	about	key	changes	to	
the	regulation	of	banking	activities.		These	main	changes	impose	a	series	of	new	
requirements	on	banks	and	include	the	following:	change	in	the	definition	of	the	
assets	that	can	be	counted	as	regulatory	capital;	increased	capital	requirements	
that	 cover	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 risk	 types;	 a	 new	 leverage	 ratio	 restricting	 the	
amount	 of	money	banks	 are	 able	 to	borrow;	 new	 rules	 on	 bank	 liquidity;	 new	
rules	 on	 risk	management	 and	 governance	 ‐	 intended	 to	 improve	 the	ways	 in	
which	 banks	 assess,	monitor	 and	 control	 their	 risks;	 and	 enhanced	 disclosure	
requirements	 relating	 to	 the	 securitisation	 of	 assets.	 	 While	 the	 reforms	
proposed	by	the	Basel	Committee	and	put	forward	in	the	form	of	Basel	III	are	of	
central	importance	to	the	banks	and	financial	institutions	that	will	be	bound	by	
them,	 it	 is	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 process	 that	 this	 paper	 will	
consider,	in	light	of	global	administrative	legal	principles.		
	
V.	 GLOBAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	LAW	RULE	MAKING	
	
The	 Basel	 Committee	 exercises	 power	 in	 a	 separate	 and	 distinct	manner	 from	
other	 international	 organisations.	 Despite	 lacking	 binding	 legal	 authority,	 its	
decisions	carry	significant	weight	and	influence.		 	Global	governance	and	Global	
Administrative	Law	are	distinct	from	a	traditional	understanding	of	international	
law.		From	the	brief	description	of	Basel	I	and	II,	it	should	begin	to	be	clear	that	
the	Basel	Committee	deals	with	highly	technical	and	specific	areas	that	require	
specialist	 knowledge	 to	 implement	 policy.	 	 The	 specialist	 knowledge	 and	
expertise	 required	 consequently	 means	 that	 the	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 Basel	
Committee	are,	in	the	majority,	only	understood	by	those	parties	that	have	direct	
interest	in	their	application.	
	
In	particular	for	the	Basel	Committee,	global	administrative	law	looks	behind	the	
technical	 aspects	 of	 its	 decisions	 and	 assesses	 the	 processes	 used	 to	 reach	
conclusions.	 	One	of	the	key	criticisms	levelled	at	the	Basel	Committee	is	that	it	
lacks	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	 	 Despite	 having	 no	 binding	 force,	 the	
decisions	taken	by	the	Basel	Committee	arguably	constitutes	‘law’.	Furthermore,	
because	of	the	wide‐ranging	impact	Basel	Committee	policies	have,	it	should	be	
obvious	 of	 the	 need	 for	 global	 administrative	 law	 to	 ensure	 that	 decisions	 are	
made	in	an	open,	transparent,	and	accountable	way.		
	
As	global	governance	marks	a	departure	from	traditional	international	law,	there	
is	 disagreement	 about	 what	 law	 is.	 	 Benedict	 Kingsbury	 seeks	 to	 clarify	 the	
concept	of	global	administrative	 law,	by	proposing	 that	 “an	extended	positivist	
concept	 of	 law	 should	 be	 adopted.”19		 A	 positivist	 approach	 towards	 Global	
Administrative	 Law	 seeks	 to	 establish	 a	 clear	 basis	 of	 rules	 that	 would	 allow	
institutions	such	as	the	Basel	Committee	to	set	as	fundamental	procedural	rules.	
	
VI.	 BASEL	COMMITTEE’S	ADHERENCE	TO	GLOBAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	LAW	
	
																																																								
19	 Benedict	Kingsbury,	“The	Concept	of	‘Law’	In	Global	Administrative	Law”	(2009)	EJIL	20,	
at	29.	
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Barr	 and	Miller	 highlighted	 what	 they	 saw	 as	 administrative	 law	mechanisms	
utilised	by	the	Basel	Committee.	 	They	refer	specifically	to	notice	and	comment	
rule‐making	by	the	Basel	Committee	as	a	key	way	it	promotes	accountability	and	
legitimacy,	 and	 reduce	 criticisms	 of	 any	 perceived	 democratic	 deficit.	 	 As	 Barr	
and	 Miller	 acknowledge,	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 “has	 become	 more	 accountable	
over	time.”20	The	question	is,	has	this	increased	accountability	continued	or	was	
it	 neglected	 in	 favour	 of	 speed	 and	 efficiency	 in	 the	 face	 of	 crisis?	 	 The	 Basel	
Committee	 states	 that	 in	 order	 for	 the	 global	 banking	 system	 to	 gain	 greater	
resilience,	 a	 consistent	 approach	 in	 the	 adoption	 and	 implementation	 of	 Basel	
standards	is	critical.	
	
Benvenisti	 argues	 that	 transnational	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	 Committee	
“would	 be	 capable	 of	 responding	 to	 a	 great	 number	 of	 global	 collective	 action	
problems	 in	ways	 that	…	promote	efficiency	…	democracy	and	social	 justice.”21		
Through	the	global	administrative	 legal	standards	put	 forward	by	Kingsbury	et	
alia,	we	can	determine	whether	the	Basel	Committee	has	the	ability	to	respond	to	
global	 problems	 in	 ways	 that	 not	 only	 promote	 efficiency	 but	 also	 enhance	
democracy	and	social	justice.		
	
A. ADMINISTRATIVE	STRUCTURES	
	
The	first	standard	to	be	considered	will	be	that	of	the	administrative	structures	
that	are	 in	place	 to	provide	proper	oversight	and	governance	of	 the	policy	and	
regulatory	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 committee.	 At	 the	 domestic	 level,	
administrative	 structures	 and	 division	 of	 powers	 are	 clearly	 set	 out,	 often	 by	
constitutional	 convention,	 to	 ensure	 proper	 processes	 are	 followed	 to	 reach	 a	
democratically	 acceptable	 outcome.	 	 Benvenisti	 proposes	 that	 to	 provide	 for	 a	
structured	 decision	 making	 process	 in	 transnational	 institutions,	 that	 also	
enhances	 the	 accountability	 of	 domestic	 institutions	 that	 implement	 decisions,	
requires	three	essential	democratic	tools.	 	Firstly,	to	counterbalance	the	lack	of	
democratic	 oversight	 at	 the	 Basel	 level,	 international	 organisations	must	 have	
improved	processes	to	provide	national	organisations	with	relevant	information,	
so	 voters	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 scrutinise.	 	 	 Secondly,	 Benvenisti	 argues	 that	 if	
transnational	 institutions	 provide	 open	 access	 to	 their	 procedures,	 this	 “gives	
domestic	 populations	 an	 opportunity	 to	 influence	 regional	 and	 global	 polices	
that	 affect	 their	 interests	 …	 provid[ing]	 a	 voice	without	 a	 vote.”22		 Finally,	 the	
third	democratic	tool	to	enhance	administrative	structures	in	a	democratic	way	
recognises	the	necessity	to	insulate	transnational	organisations	from	politics.	
	
The	Basel	Committee	is	presently	governed	by	its	Charter	of	201323		that	sets	out	
the	 administrative	 and	 governance	 structure	 of	 the	 greater	 organisation.	 	 It	 is	
comprised	 of	 four	 main	 groups.	 	 These	 are	 (1)	 the	 Committee,	 (2)	 Working	
																																																								
20		 Above,	n	3	at	24.	
21		 Eyal	Benvenisti	“Exit	and	Voice	in	the	Age	of	Globalization	(1999)	98	Michigan	Law	
Review	167	at	202.	
22		 Ibid	at	208.	
23	 Bank	for	International	Settlements,	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	Charter,	
January	2013.	
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groups,	 (3)	 the	Chairman,	and	(4)	 the	Secretariat.	 	The	Charter	clearly	sets	out	
the	responsibilities	of	each	group	that	comprises	the	Basel	Committee.	
Importantly,	 the	 Charter	 provides	 for	 a	 number	 of	 key	 administrative	 tasks,	
including	the	functions	of	the	Committee,	the	number	of	meetings	that	must	be	
held,	 and	 who	 may	 be	 represented	 at	 meetings.	 	 Clause	 8.5	 provides	 that	
“decisions	of	public	interest	shall	be	communicated	through	the	BCBS	website.”24	
A	 further	 example	 of	 a	 clear	 administrative	 structure	 is	 found	 in	 the	 Charter	
where	 the	 standards,	 guidelines	 and	 sound	 practices	 are	 defined,	 so	 that	
expectations	upon	members	is	clear.	What	the	Charter	demonstrates	is	that	the	
range	of	bodies	affected	by	decisions	of	the	Committee,	states,	individuals,	firms,	
private	 organisations,	 all	 have	 the	 ability	 and	 opportunity	 to	 partake	 in	 the	
decision‐making	stages.	
	
The	Committee	is	also	supported	by	the	Secretariat	of	the	Bank	for	International	
Settlements.	 This	 is	 staffed	 by	 professional	 staff	 who	 provide	 support	 the	
Committee	in	range	of	ways	including	the	effective	flow	of	information,	support	
inter‐institutional	cooperation	and	maintain	records.		To	a	significant	extent,	the	
advanced	administrative	structures	in	place	shows	a	high	degree	of	commitment	
by	the	Committee	to	demonstrating	an	open	and	transparent	regulatory	process.	
Procedural	 transparency	 such	 as	 this	 is	 unusual	 amongst	 international	 and	
intergovernmental	 networks,	 Kingsbury	 et	 alia	 acknowledge	 that	 this	 type	 of	
openness	is	“a	striking	development	for	regulatory	networks	whose	informality	
is	often	their	main	advantage.”25	
	
B. TRANSPARENCY	
	
Lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 the	 Committee’s	 processes	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	
criticisms	during	Basel	I.		Through	the	development	of	Basel	II,	and	now	Basel	III,	
the	 Committee	 has	 actively	worked	 to	 increase	 transparency	 of	 the	 regulatory	
processes.		With	increased	accessibility	to	information	thanks	to	growing	use	of	
the	 internet,	 the	Basel	 Committee’s	 processes	 are	more	 transparent	 than	 ever.		
The	 Basel	 Committee	 acknowledges	 that	 “[c]onsistency	 in	 the	 adoption	 and	
implementation	of	Basel	 standards	 is	 critical	 to	 improving	 the	 resilience	of	 the	
global	 banking	 system,	 promoting	 public	 confidence	 …	 and	 encourage	 a	
predictable	 and	 transparent	 regulatory	 environment	 for	 internationally	 active	
banks.”26	There	 has	 been	 an	 effort	 by	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 to	 demonstrate	 an	
open	 and	 transparent	 process	 throughout	 the	 various	 regulatory	 stages.	 	 A	
further	requirement	on	the	Committee	is	that	it	must	provide	regular	updates	to	
G20	members	on	the	implementation	process.		
	
To	ensure	an	open	and	transparent	approach	is	maintained,	the	Basel	Committee	
adopted	the	Basel	III	Regulatory	Consistency	Assessment	Programme	(RCAP)27.		
																																																								
24		 Ibid,	at	4.		
25		 Above,	n	10	at	35.	
26		 Bank	for	International	Settlements,	Inmplementation	of	Basel	standards	–	Regulatory	
Consistency	Assessment	Programme	(RCAP)	
<www.bis.org/bcbs/implemnetation.htm?m=3%7C14%7C587>.	
27		 Banking	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision,	Basel	III	Regulatory	Consistency	
Assessment	Programme,	October	2013.	
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The	RCAP	has	two	primary	goals.		The	first	is	to	monitor	the	adoption	of	Basel	III	
standards,	and	the	second	 is	 to	assess	 the	consistency	and	completeness	of	 the	
adopted	standards.		As	a	result	of	the	highly	specialised	nature	of	the	work,	“the	
RCAP	 assessments	 are	 designed	 as	 ‘peer	 reviews’	 undertaken	 by	 technical	
experts	 from	member	jurisdictions.”28		During	the	assessment	process,	member	
states	 are	 graded	 on	 a	 compliance	 scale.	 	 The	 compliance	 scale	 of	 domestic	
regulatory	 frameworks	 ranges	 from	 compliant,	 largely	 compliant,	 materially	
non‐compliant,	 or	 non‐compliant.	 	 These	 standards	 are	 applied	 to	 all	member	
states,	 and	 this	 guarantees	 a	 standardised	 approach	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	
Basel	standards.	
	
When	 considering	 the	 steps	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 has	 taken	 to	 increase	
transparency	of	its	own	processes,	this	needs	to	be	considered	in	light	of	global	
administrative	legal	norms.		It	is	especially	important	to	consider	whether	these	
steps	go	far	enough	to	provide	for	adequate	transparency	of	processes.		Despite	
obvious	efforts	from	the	Basel	Committee	to	move	towards	greater	transparency,	
there	are	trade‐offs	that	must	be	taken	into	account.		For	example,	it	is	suggested	
that,	 “transparency	 can	 mean	 populism	 triumphs	 over	 justice.” 29 	This	
demonstrates	 the	distinction	 that	must	be	drawn	between	situations	of	closed‐
door	negotiations	and	complete	openness	where	 the	 technical	 requirements	of	
regulations	are	watered	down	by	interest	groups.	
	
Arguably,	 the	 decision‐making	 stages	 of	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 provide	 an	
excellent	example	of	public	law	being	adapted	for	the	global	transgovernmental	
space.	 It	 is	 of	 an	 advantage	 to	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 that	 it	 is	 not	 formally	
constituted,	or	bound	by	international	treaties.		This	provides	greater	flexibility	
for	it	to	meet	the	requirements	of	the	member	states.	
	
C. PARTICIPATORY	ELEMENTS	IN	THE	PROCEDURAL	PROCESS	
	
Participation	 is	 central	 to	democracy.	 	While	participation	 is	not,	 and	arguably	
cannot,	be	universal	for	organisations	such	as	the	Basel	Committee,	it	is	vital	for	
those	who	are	most	impacted	by	its	decisions	to	have	appropriate	opportunities	
to	participate	 in	 the	procedural	process.	 	The	Charter	provides	a	starting	point	
for	 how	 the	 Committee	 ensures	 that	 participation	 is	 a	 central	 aspect	 of	 the	
procedural	 process.	 	 Clause	 2	 of	 the	 Charter	 states	 that	 in	 order	 for	 the	 Basel	
Committee	 to	 achieve	 its	mandate	of	 strengthening	 the	 regulation,	 supervision	
and	 practices	 of	 banks	 worldwide,	 it	 will	 undertake	 a	 number	 of	 specific	
activities.	 	 	 Specific	 to	 participation,	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 requires	 the	
“exchanging	 information	 on	 developments	 in	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 financial	
markets[,]	 and	 shares	 “supervisory	 issues,	 approaches	 and	 techniques	 to	
promote	 common	understanding	 and	 to	 improve	 cross‐border	 cooperation[.]30	
Clause	5(d)	of	the	Charter	also	requires	that	members	of	the	Committee	“actively	
contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 [Basel]	 standards,	 guidelines	 and	 sound	
practices[.]”	 	 Importantly,	 participation	 and	 involvement	 of	 non‐Committee	
																																																								
28		 Ibid	at	3.	
29	 Nico	Krisch	&	Benedict	Kingsbury	“Introduction:	Global	Governance	and	Global	
Administrative	Law	in	the	International	Legal	Order”	(2006)	17	EJIL	at	4.	
30		 Above,	n	23.	
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members	is	encouraged.		The	participation	of	non‐members	is	also	a	key	aspect	
of	the	2013	Charter.		Non‐member	authorities	are	consulted	widely	on	the	Basel	
Committee’s	 activities.	 	 	 There	 are	 five	 methods	 that	 encourage	 and	 foster	
greater	 participation	 amongst	 global	 regulators	 of	 countries	 that	 are	 not	
members.	 The	 Basel	 Consultative	 Group	 is	 a	 forum	 that	 deepens	 the	 Basel	
Committee’s	 engagement	 with	 supervisors	 around	 the	 world	 by	 facilitating	
dialogue	 with	 non‐members	 on	 Committee	 initiatives.	 	 A	 biennial	 meeting,	
known	 as	 the	 International	 Conferences	 of	 Banking	 Supervisors,	 is	 held	 to	
provide	 a	 venue	 for	 supervisors	 to	 discuss	 issues	 of	 importance	 and	 interest.		
Participation	 in	 Committee	 activities	 is	 also	 encouraged	 by	 allowing	 non‐
member	authorities	to	act	as	observers	in	the	Basel	Committee’s	various	groups	
aides	in	policy	development	undertaken	by	the	Committee.			
	
Another	 form	 of	 participation	 in	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 process	 is	 through	 the	
Financial	 Stability	 Institute.	 	 This	 body	works	 to	 assist	 supervisors	 around	 the	
world	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 sound	 prudential	 standards.	 	 It	 also	 keeps	
participants	updated	on	the	work	of	the	Basel	Committee	by	sharing	supervisory	
practices	and	concerns,	and	by	establishing	and	maintaining	strong	professional	
relationships.		The	final	method	of	participation	under	the	Charter	is	through	the	
Committee	supporting	regional	groups	of	banking	supervisors.	 	 	These	regional	
groups	are	 supported	by	 the	Bank	of	 International	 Settlements	 secretariat	 and	
provide	another	forum	for	groups	to	exchange	ideas	and	obtain	feedback	on	the	
Basel	Committee’s	work.	
	
Under	 domestic	 law	 administrative	 law	 recognises	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals	 to	
have	 their	 views	 heard	 and	 have	 any	 information	 considered	 before	 decision	
makers	 reach	 a	 conclusion.	 	 While	 still	 limited	 in	 use,	 there	 is	 increasing	
opportunity	for	participation	to	occur	in	relation	to	administrative	actions	taken	
by	 intergovernmental	 bodies.	 	 For	 comparison,	 the	 International	 Olympic	
Committee’s	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 code	 applies	 normative	 principles	 of	
administrative	 law	 “to	 constrain	 administrative	 decision‐making	 in	 a	 private	
institutional	 setting.” 31 	Such	 normative	 principles	 exist	 within	 the	 Basel	
Committee’s	participatory	processes	and	demonstrate	how	it	is	a	very	open	and	
comparatively	democratic	un‐elected	transgovernmental	institution.	
	 	
D.	 PRINCIPLES	OF	REASONED	DECISION‐MAKING	 	
	
Critically	for	the	Basel	Committee,	because	of	the	complex	nature	of	its	work,	in	
order	to	meet	global	administrative	legal	standards,	it	must	adhere	to	principles	
of	 reasoned	 decision‐making.	 	 This	 ensures	 some	 degree	 of	 certainty	 behind	
decisions	 and	provides	 assurances	 to	 interested	 countries	 about	how	and	why	
decisions	have	been	reached.	
	
Kingsbury	et	alia	state	that	the	practice	of	providing	reasons	for	administrative	
decisions	 in	 international	 law	 is	 “relatively	 thin.”32		 However,	 the	 practice	 of	
providing	 decisions	 is	 slowly	 growing.	 	 Kingsbury	 points	 to	 the	 World	 Trade	
																																																								
31		 Above,	n	10	at	38.	
32		 Above,	n	10	at	39.	
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Organization	 (WTO)	 decision	 in	 the	Shrimp‐Turtle	 case	 as	 providing	 a	 starting	
point	 for	 establishing	 principles	 of	 reasoned	 decision	 making	 in	 global	
administrative	law.		The	Shrimp‐Turtle33	case	was	a	dispute	between	the	United	
States	 and	 India,	 Malaysia,	 Pakistan,	 and	 Thailand	 about	 the	 United	 States’	
import	prohibition	of	certain	shrimp	and	shrimp	products.		The	WTO	Panel	was	
convened	 to	 examine	 a	 prohibition	 on	 the	 importation	 of	 certain	 shrimp	 and	
shrimp	 products	 could	 be	 justified.	 	 The	 relevant	 regulation	 prohibited	 the	
importation	of	shrimp	that	were	harvested	using	commercial	fishing	techniques	
the	had	the	potential	to	adversely	affect	sea	turtles.		
	
Of	 concern	 was	 that	 the	 United	 States	 appeared	 to	 favour	 certain	 states	 in	
providing	exceptions	 to	 the	prohibition.	The	application	of	 the	policy,	 “through	
the	implementing	guidelines	together	with	administrative	practice	…	resulted	in	
other	 differential	 treatment	 among	 various	 countries	 desiring	 certification	 [to	
export	shrimp	to	the	United	States].”34		The	WTO	Appellate	body	found	that	the	
certification	processes	followed	by	the	United	States	appeared	to	be	“singularly	
informal	 and	 casual,	 and	 …	 conducted	 in	 a	 manner	 such	 that	 these	 processes	
could	 result	 in	 the	 negation	 of	 rights	 of	Members	 [of	 the	WTO].”35	It	 also	 held	
that	the	way	that	the	United	States	enforced	its	policy	provided	no	certainty	that	
it	was	being	applied	in	a	fair	and	just	manner,	essentially	denying	“basic	fairness	
…	 due	 process	 …	 and	 [Members]	 are	 discriminated	 against	 …	 those	 Members	
which	 are	 granted	 certification.”36		 In	 conclusion,	 the	 WTO	 held	 that	 if	 basic	
processes	that	were	inconsistent	with	minimum	standards	for	transparency	and	
procedural	fairness	would	be	in	breach	of	treaty	obligations.	
	
Taking	the	Shrimp‐Turtle	case	as	a	benchmark,	there	are	fundamental	elements	
necessary	for	reasoned	decision‐making	as	understood	by	administrative	law	to	
be	properly	implemented.		The	Basel	Committee	arguably	meets	the	standard	of	
providing	 reasoned	 decisions	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 Basel	 III.	 	Where	 new	
capital	 adequacy	 standards	 are	 proposed,	 they	 are	 posted	 on	 the	 Committee’s	
website.	 	 Feedback	 and	 comments	 are	 invited	 from	 the	 public	 and	 interested	
parties.		Following	opportunities	for	comment	by	the	public,	the	Committee	will	
provide	reasons	for	any	subsequent	revised	drafts.	
	
E.	MECHANISMS	OF	REVIEW	
	
An	 important	aspect	of	administrative	 law	is	 for	decision‐making	organisations	
to	 provide	 the	 appropriate	 mechanisms	 and	 processes	 in	 place	 for	 review	 of	
decisions	to	take	place	after	decisions	have	been	made.		
	
This	 paper	 has	 already	 briefly	 described	 the	 main	 changes	 to	 be	 brought	 in	
under	the	changes	from	Basel	III.		These	are	to	be	phased	in	progressively	from	
2011	 until	 2019.	 	 As	 with	 any	 significant	 change	 in	 regulation,	 	 there	 are	
concerns	 about	 how	 the	 impact	 these	 reforms	 will	 have.	 	 Of	 interest	 is	 what	
																																																								
33		 United	States	–	Import	Prohibition	of	Certain	Shrimp	and	Shrimp	Products,	AB‐1998‐4,	
World	Trade	Organization	Appellate	Body.	
34		 Ibid	at	20.	
35		 Above,	n	33	at	22.	
36		 Ibid.	
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mechanisms	are	 in	place	 for	members	of	 the	Committee	and	 related	parties	 to	
ask	 for	 review	 of	 the	 changes	 already	made,	 and	whether	 there	 has	 been	 any	
changes	as	a	result	of	review,	if	any.		
	
The	Basel	Committee	maintains	a	 large	 internet	 forum	where	 its	proposals	are	
published	 and	 provides	 anyone	 who	 wishes	 to	 the	 opportunity	 to	 comment.		
Following	 initial	 publication	 and	 redrafting	 the	 Committee	 offers	 reasons	 for	
changes	 in	 each	 subsequent	 draft.	 	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 extensive	 pre	
implementation	of	regulation	stages	that	the	Basel	Committee	conducts,	review	
mechanisms	are	 to	some	extent,	 less	obvious.	 	Of	 importance	 is	again,	how	the	
Basel	 Committee	 responded	 to	 the	 Global	 Financial	 Crisis.	 	 This	 demonstrated	
the	need	to	review	the	Basel	Standards,	and	began	the	review	process.		A	number	
of	faults	were	identified	in	Basel	II.		Basel	II’s	failures	during	the	Global	Financial	
Crisis	 arguably	 served	 as	 a	 necessary	 mechanism	 of	 review,	 because	 of	 the	
obvious	need	for	better	protections	for	the	global	financial	institutions.				
	
Helpfully	to	support	the	idea	that	there	is	some	form	of	review	mechanism,	it	is	
acknowledged	 that	 “[u]nfortunately,	 financial	 regulation	 is	 far	 from	a	 scientific	
enterprise.	 	 New	 regulations	 often	 respond	 to	 the	 last	 crisis	 rather	 than	
forestalling	 the	 next	 one.”37	Adoption	 of	 Basel	 II	 norms	 resulted	 in	 several	
mistakes	 being	 made	 by	 regulators	 across	 the	 globe.	 	 	 This	 included	 placing	
heavy	 emphasis	 on	 capital	 levels	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 other	 financial	 concerns.		
Therefore,	 banks	 were	 required	 to	 hold	 higher	 levels	 of	 capital.	 	 The	 recent	
Global	 Financial	 Crisis	 also	 showed	 that	 banks	 lacked	 sufficient	 liquidity,	
meaning	banks	could	not	meet	immediate	cash	needs.		Levinson	points	out	that	
one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 why	 stronger	 liquidity	 rules	 were	 not	 in	 place	 was	
“because	 Basel	 II	 did	 not	 mandate	 them.”38		 Another	 failure	 of	 Basel	 II	 was	
instructing	 national	 regulators	 to	 determine	 the	 amount	 of	 capital	 individuals	
banks	were	required	to	hold	was	based	on	the	 level	of	risk	associated	with	the	
business	that	it	conducted.	
	
These	examples	provide	only	some	insight	into	the	range	of	issues	faced	by	Basel	
II	during	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.		It	is	how	the	Basel	Committee	responded	to	
these	 failures	 to	 begin	 an	 appropriate	 review	 of	 its	 procedures	 is	 what	 is	
important	under	a	Global	Administrative	Law	approach.		The	failures	exposed	in	
Basel	 II	 directly	 resulted	 in	 Basel	 III.	 	 Although	 writing	 before	 Basel	 III	 was	
formalised,	 Levinson	 states	 that	 various	 proposals	 were	 discussed	 including	
“requiring	 banks	 to	 maintain	 additional	 capital,	 limiting	 bankers’	 pay,	
supervising	big	transnational	insurance	groups,	and	recommending	…	subprime	
mortgage	 securities	 [be	 held	 by	 banks]	 rather	 than	 selling	 them	 all	 to	
investors.”39		 He	 acknowledges	 that	 while	 these	 proposals,	 had	 they	 been	 in	
place,	may	have	avoided	the	last	financial	crisis.	 	Due	to	the	uncertain	nature	of	
international	financial	regulation,	it	must	be	remembered	that	“[n]o	one	can	say	
with	certainty	what	the	best	rules	are.”40		However,	as	the	Basel	Committee	has	
																																																								
37		 Marc	Levinson	“Faulty	Basel,	Why	More	Diplomacy	Won’t	Keep	the	Financial	System	
Safe”	(2010)	89	Foreign	Affairs	3	at	81.	
38		 Ibid.	
39		 Above,	n	37	at	86.	
40		 Ibid.	
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shown,	when	required,	it	is	able	to	respond	and	adapt	to	the	changing	needs	of	
the	financial	sector.	
	
Additionally,	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 issues	 regular	 progress	 reports	 on	 the	
adoption	of	the	Basel	regulatory	framework	by	Basel	Members.		These	progress	
reports	 provide	 a	 high‐level	 snapshot	 of	 the	 progress	 in	 adopting	 all	 of	 the	
Committees	regulatory	standards.			For	example,	the	eighth	progress	report	was	
published	and	reflects	on	progress	as	at	 the	end	of	March	2015.	 	The	progress	
reports	allow	 the	Committee	 to	monitor	 implementation	 in	 individual	member	
states.		This	process	provides	a	consistent	and	timely	internal	review	mechanism	
to	ensure	regulatory	policies	are	being	implemented	in	line	with	the	Committee’s	
expectations.		
	
	
VI.	 THE	 BASEL	 COMMITTEE	 –	 ENHANCING	 ACCOUNTABILITY	 AND	 THE	
DEMOCRATIC	PROCESS	
	
Criticism	 of	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 centre	 around	 the	 lack	 of	
democratic	accountability.		The	methods	described	above	seek	to	dispel	the	myth	
that	 unelected	 international	 governing	 bodies	 bare	 no	 resemblance	 to	
comparable	 organisations	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 	 Accountability	 is	 central	 for	
both	 reputation,	 and	 the	 Basel	 Committee’s	 ability	 to	 fulfil	 its	 mandate.	 	 The	
Basel	 Committee,	 as	 one	 of	 many	 international	 regulatory	 institutions	 on	 the	
global	level	is	highly	accountability	to	its	own	constituents.		It	is	recognised	that	
despite	the	acknowledgement	that	such	institutions	are	in	fact	accountable.	
	
As	 Krisch	 points	 out	 international	 governance	 organisations	 do	 not	 have	 “an	
absolute	 accountability	 ‘deficit’,	 to	 be	 overcome	 by	 improving	 accountability	
mechanisms,	 [r]ather,	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 these	 institutions	 are	 often	
accountability	 in	 the	 wrong	 way	 …	 [and	 to]	 the	 wrong	 constituencies.”41	
Institutions	 such	 as	 the	World	 Bank	 represent	 a	 powerful	 global	 body	 that	 is	
tasked	 with	 important	 governing	 responsibilities	 that	 have	 direct	 effect	 on	
states,	organisations,	and	 individuals	alike.	 	The	requirement	 for	accountability	
of	international	organisations	leaves	the	question	of	to	whom	institutions	should	
be	 accountable	 to.	 	 This	 problem	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 existing	
power	 structure	 of	 the	World	Bank,	with	 a	 focus	 on	western	 developed	 states	
exercising	 the	 majority	 of	 control	 functions.	 Should	 a	 change	 in	 the	 power	
structures	 change,	 and	 “[i]f	 [it]	 allowed	 for	 stronger	 representation	 and	
participation	of	developing	 countries	and	 their	 citizens,	 the	 funders	 that	 so	 far	
dominate	 the	 Bank	 would	 lose	 influence.”42		 A	 similar	 problem	 exists	 for	 the	
Basel	Committee,	because	influence	sits	predominately	with	its	members,	the	G‐
20.		However,	this	is	mitigated	by	the	openness	of	the	Committee	to	include	non‐
members	in	its	regulatory	process.		
	
As	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 has	 taken	 a	
number	 of	 steps	 to	 enhance	 accountability	 and	 its	 own	 democratic	 processes.		
																																																								
41		 Nico	Krisch	“The	Pluralisim	of	Global	Administrative	Law”	(2006)	17	EJIL	1	At	250.	
42		 Ibid	at	251.		
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While	 it	may	still	be	some	way	off	becoming	a	 truly	democratic	 institution,	 the	
steps	that	it	takes	to	ensure	opinions	and	views	are	heard	and	considered	is	an	
important	step	towards	greater	democratisation.	
	
VII.	 GLOBAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	LAW	–	WHERE	TO	NOW?	
	
In	 theory,	 the	 processes	 followed	 by	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 have	 created	 an	
institution	that	is	arguably	one	of	the	best	models	of	global	administrative	law	in	
action.	 	 It	 represents	 the	 normative	 dimensions	 of	 global	 administrative	 law.		
Importantly,	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 helps	 to	 focus	 the	
democratisation	 of	 global	 administration	 by	 focusing	 on	 “Controlling	 the	
periphery	 to	 ensure	 [that	 regimes	 are]	 building	 meaningful	 and	 effective	
mechanisms	to	control	abuses	of	power	and	secure	rule	of	law	values.”43		The	on	
going	 development	 of	 Global	 Administrative	 Law	 depends	 on	 the	 question	 of	
“what	we	consider	democracy	to	be,	what	sort	of	concept	we	think	it	is,	and	what	
function	we	see	it	performing.”44	
	
Susan	Marks	questions	the	very	role	of	democracy	as	an	 integral	part	of	global	
administrative	 law.	 	 Marks	 argues	 that	 “[o]nly	 by	 moving	 to	 the	 level	 of	
principles	can	we	adequately	explain	and	evaluate	democratic	claims	[of	global	
governing	 institutions].”45	The	 development	 of	 global	 governance	 needs	 to	 be	
considered	 in	 light	 of	 the	 development	 of	 democracy	 in	 general.	 	 For	 national	
democracies	 to	 succeed	 in	 todays	 increasingly	 globalised	 world,	 nation‐states	
“depend	 inescapably	 on	 the	 prospects	 of	 global	 democracy.”46		 For	 enhanced	
democracy	 to	 succeed	 on	 the	 global	 stage,	 recognition	 of	 the	 possibilities	 for	
global	administrative	law	take	the	place	of	strict	needs	for	enhanced	democracy.		
Global	 administrative	 law	 provides	 a	 powerful	 tool	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
democratisation	of	global	governance	in	general.		
	
VIII.	 DO	WE	REALLY	NEED	GLOBAL	ADMINISTRATIVE	LAW?	
	
Anne‐Marie	Slaughter	helpfully	highlights	some	of	 the	main	concerns	that	have	
been	 raised	 in	 relation	 to	 accountability	 issues	 faced	 by	 transgovernmental	
institutions	 and	 organisations.	 	 Slaughter	 highlights	 the	 traditional	
understanding	of	international	organisations	based	on	the	idea	that	“if	they	are	
duly	 established	 by	 treaty,	with	 the	 attendant	 national	 ratification	procedures,	
they	 exercise	 only	 delegated	 powers	 …	 and	 do	 not	 raise	 any	 formal	
accountability	 concerns.” 47 	On	 this	 traditional	 model	 of	 international	
organisations,	institutions	had	clearly	defined	areas	of	responsibility	and	a	clear	
mandate	 about	what	was	 to	 be	 achieved.	 	 	 Furthermore,	 Slaughter	 states	 that	
“[t]ransgovernmental	networks	within	 the	 framework	of	 executive	 agreements	
are	 often	 less	 visible	 than	 transgovernmental	 networks	 within	 established	
																																																								
43		 Above,	n	2	at	51.	
44		 Susan	Marks,	“Naming	Global	Administrative	Law”	(2004‐5)	37	N.Y.U	Journal	of	
International	Law	and	Politics	995,	at	1000.	
45		 Ibid.	
46		 Ibid.	
47		 Anne‐Marie	Slaughter	“Global	Government	Networks,	Global	Information	Agencies,	and	
Disaggregated	Democracy”	24	Michigan	Jounral	of	International	Law	1041,	at	1054.	
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institutions.”48	The	problem	that	Slaughter	 is	referring	 to	refers	 to	the	 fact	that	
institutions	 like	 Basel,	 that	 are	 created	 by	 governments,	 outside	 usual	 treaty	
regimes	 are	 often	 subject	 to	 far	 less	 requirements	 around	 accountability	 than	
comparable	institutions.		
	
Armin	 von	 Bogdandy	 argues	 that	 a	 greater	 understanding	 of	 global	
administrative	 law	 helps	 to	 understand	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 global	
governance	more	generally.	 	As	domestic	public	principles	inform	international	
administrative	 law,	 a	 comparative	 approach	 is	 desirable.	 	 Von	 Bogdandy	
recognises	that	while	“the	principles	of	international	public	authority	cannot	be	
simple	 copies	 of	 domestic	 principles	 because	 international	 institutions	 are	
different:	 the	 domestic	 analogy,	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 an	 exercise	 of	
international	authority	parallels	an	exercise	of	domestic	authority	in	all	essential	
elements,	 [is	 not	 convincing].”49		 The	 European	 Union,	 (EU)	 for	 von	 Bogdandy	
provides	 “the	 most	 important	 application	 of	 public	 law	 principles	 beyond	 the	
nation	 state.”50	However,	 he	 reasons	 that	 the	 EU,	 as	 an	 example	 of	 integrated	
domestic	 and	 international	 public	 law	 mechanisms,	 is	 unique	 and	 not	
transferrable.	
	
This	 reasoning	 is	 based	 on	 the	 quasi‐federal	 makeup	 of	 the	 EU.	 	 The	 EU	 has	
developed	 public	 law	 powers	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 universally	 binding	 Treaty	 on	
European	Union,	as	implemented	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty.			The	EU,	he	argues,	is	not	
a	 body	where	 the	 global	 doctrine	 of	 principles	 around	 administrative	 law	 can	
apply.	This	is	because	the	EU	“is	rooted	in	its	territory	and	citizens,	on	a	judiciary	
endowed	with	strong	competences,	and	on	a	largely	parliamentary	legislature.”51		
He	reinforces	the	uniqueness	of	the	EU	in	the	international	legal	order	by	citing	
the	 role	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 and	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 EU’s	 integrated	
legal	order,	as	contained	under	the	EU’s	founding	treaties.		
	
Perhaps	 in	 one	 of	 von	 Bogdandy’s	 most	 decisive	 statements	 on	 the	 status	 of	
global	 administrative	 law,	he	acknowledges	 that	 at	 times	global	 administrative	
law	“is	in	some	respects	too	broad	[it	is	also]	too	narrow	in	others	[and]	of	little	
use;	 useful	 only	 to	 investigate	 principles	 which	 deal	 exclusively	 with	
administrative	 activity.”52	However,	 he	 does	 recognise	 the	 importance	of	many	
international	 normative	 features,	 and	 acknowledges	 the	 role	 that	 international	
principles	 play	 in	 administrative	 procedures.	 	 In	 completing	 his	 assessment	 of	
global	administrative	law,	he	supports	the	general	idea	that	there	should	be	both	
a	 theoretical	 and	doctrinal	 framework	 for	global	 administrative	 law	 to	provide	
linkages	between	international,	supranational	and	national	public	law	principles.		
	
A	unified	set	of	principles	under	the	global	administrative	law	banner,	as	argued	
by	 von	Bogdandy,	will	 not	 succeed	 at	 this	 point	 because	 there	 is	 a	 “lack	 of	 an	
																																																								
48		 Ibid	at	1055.	
49		 Armin	von	Bogdandy	“General	Principles	of	International	Public	Authority:	Sketching	a	
Research	Field”	(2010)	9	German	Law	Journal	1909‐1938	at	1919‐1920.	
50		 Ibid	at	1920.	
51		 Ibid.		
52		 Ibid.			
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elaborate	doctrine	of	sources	as	well	as	the	lack	of	a	doctrine	of	direct	effect.”53		
In	this	he	refers	to	the	EU	legal	principle	of	direct	effect	of	Union	legislation	upon	
member	 states,	 and	 how	 this	 is	 then	 enforceable	 by	 both	 national	 and	 Union	
level	judiciaries.			As	there	is	no	comparable	application	and	enforcement	power	
for	global	administrative	law	demonstrates	the	difficulty	advocates	of	the	theory	
pose	in	its	development.	This	critique	by	von	Bogdandy	is	specific	to	the	global	
administrative	legal	theory,	but	as	already	stated;	there	are	concerns	that	global	
governance	generally	suffers	from	legitimacy	problems	that	cannot	effectively	be	
overcome.		
	
Critics	 of	 global	 governance	 and	 the	 international	 institutions	 operating	 with	
quasi‐law	making	 powers	 attack	 these	 institutions	 from	both	 a	 normative	 and	
descriptive	perspective.		Normatively,	the	questions	arise	around	the	validity	of	
decisions	made	by	such	international	institutions,	and	descriptively,	around	how	
society	 in	 general	 accepts	 decisions	 and	 orders	 dictated	 by	 unelected	
organisations.	 	 Critically	 for	 the	 Basel	 Committee,	 the	 democratic	 deficit	
argument	is	difficult	to	completely	remove.		International	economic	institutions,	
such	as	the	Basel	Committee	are	necessary	because	they	help	to	facilitate	growth	
and	 promote	 better	 integration	 of	 the	 global	 economy.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 success	 of	
liberalism,	 rapid	 growth	 occurred	 throughout	 developed	 western	 nations.		
However,	 the	 “paradox	 of	 post‐war	 liberalism	 is	 …	 that	 it	 has	 ruined	 its	 own	
shock‐absorbers	 [and	 limited	 the]	 capacity	 of	 an	 individual	 nation‐state	 to	
intervene	 into	market	 processes	 in	 order	 to	 cushion	 the	 undesired	 effects	 [of	
international	 economic	 policy	 decisions].”54	While	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 does	
address	many	of	 the	 issues	about	 the	 impact	market	 forces	have	on	 individual	
states,	 through	 its	 banking	 regulations,	 the	 fact	 remains	 is	 that	 once	 decisions	
have	 been	 made,	 member	 states	 are	 bound	 by	 these,	 and	 as	 Basel	 I	 and	 II	
demonstrated,	 problems	 do	 emerge	 that	 individual	 states	 can	 do	 little	 to	
mitigate.		
	
As	more	international	institutions	are	formed,	and	as	these	institutions	produce	
more	regulations,	the	need	for	democratic	decision‐making	processes	cannot	be	
ignored.		The	traditional	model	of	nation‐states	as	the	main	and	most	important	
international	decision	makers	is	being	eroded.		The	increased	intrusion	into	the	
decision‐making	 field	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	 undeniable	 fact	 that	 “new	
international	institutions	…	are	answerable	to	a	few	governments,	but	not	to	all	
the	 societies	 into	 which	 they	 intrude,	 and	 certainly	 not	 to	 a	 transnational	
society.”55		 The	 Basel	 Committee	 has	 taken	 significant	 steps	 in	 addressing	 and	
mitigating	these	concerns	through	its	more	open	consultation	process.		However,	
it	is	still	only	answerable	to	a	select	group,	while	‘intruding’	upon	a	great	many	
other	states,	organisations,	and	individuals.		
	
The	Basel	Committee	has	taken	significant	steps	since	the	global	financial	crisis	
and	 the	 implementation	 of	 Basel	 III	 began	 to	 increase	 its	 accountability	
mechanisms	and	processes	but	fails	to	take	into	account	the	views	of	developing	
																																																								
53		 Above,	n	49	at	1921.	
54		 Michael	Zürn,	“Global	Governance	and	Legitimacy	Problems”	(2004)	39	Government	and	
Opposition	2,	at	266.	
55		 Ibid	at	275.	
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countries.	 	 Despite	 all	 its	 openness,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 key	 decisions	 the	 Basel	
Committee	 meetings	 are	 attended	 by	 the	 central	 bank	 Governors	 of	 G‐20	
member	 states,	 to	 the	 exclusion	of	 states	 to	which	 these	decisions	 relate.	 Such	
meetings	“are	increasingly	focused	on	emerging‐market	developments	[but]	the	
perspective	 is	 that	 of	 the	 impact	 on	 G‐10	 economies.”56		 Developing	 states	 are	
expected	 to	 adhere	 and	 implement	 these	 decisions	 without	 any	 meaningful	
input.				
	
There	are	some	concerns	that	implementation	of	Basel	III	will	be	difficult	for	non	
G‐20	countries	to	implement.	The	reforms	put	forward	under	Basel	III	have	been	
targeted	at	large	banks	in	Europe	and	the	United	States.		For	banks	outside	of	the	
developed	 states	 it	 is	 envisaged	 that	 “[s]ome	of	 these	 things	 are	 going	 to	have	
unintended	consequences	…	for	parts	of	the	world	where	the	financial	system	is	
less	developed.”57		
	
IX.	 CONCLUSION	
	
Global	 Governance	 seeks	 to	 shift	 the	 focus	 of	 international	 law	 away	 from	 the	
traditional	understanding	of	international	law.		It	is	a	space	occupied	by	not	only	
states	 but	 also	 a	wide‐variety	 of	 actors	 across	 a	 range	 of	 policy	 areas.	 	 Global	
administrative	 law	 is	 the	 branch	 of	 global	 governance	 that	 seeks	 to	 apply	
standards	 of	 regulatory	 structures	 that	 will	 enhance	 the	 democratic	 nature	 of	
these	international	institutions.			
	
The	Basel	Committee	has	undergone	almost	constant	development	since	Basel	I	
came	into	force.		Comparatively,	the	Basel	Committee	provides	an	example	of	an	
unelected	 institution	 that	 is	 exercising	 quite	 significant	 regulatory	 powers	
without	 any	 real	 democratic	 oversight.	 	 Barr	 and	 Miller,	 writing	 in	 2006	
acknowledged	that	“[i]international	administrative	law	cannot	replace	domestic	
measures	of	 accountability	 [but	 it]	 can	act	 to	 enhance	domestic	 administrative	
law	 and	 help	 to	 strengthen	 the	 hand	 of	 reformers	 seeking	 to	 improve	
transparency.”58	In	 the	nearly	 ten	years	 since	publication,	 the	Basel	Committee	
has	 developed	 clear	 processes	 and	 opportunities	 for	 those	 not	 involved	 in	 the	
decision‐making	 process	 to	 contribute,	 notably	 the	 notice	 and	 comment	
procedure.	
			
Despite	advances	in	its	processes	and	its	increased	openness	and	monitoring	of	
the	 implementation	 of	 Basel	 III,	 it	 still	 lacks	 true	 democratic	 accountability.	
However,		as	this	paper	has	shown,	global	administrative	law	helps	to	explain	the	
advances	that	the	Committee	has	made	in	reducing	the	democratic	deficit	of	the	
organisation	to	a	point	where	clear	process	are	identifiable	that	contribute	to	the	
enhancing	of	the	Basel	Committee’s	democratic	processes.	
	
	
																																																								
56		 Roman	Grynberg	and	Sacha	Silva	“Harmonization	without	Representation:	Small	States,	
the	Basel	Committee,	and	the	WTO”	(2006)	34	World	Development	7	at	1225.	
57	 Brooke	Masters	“Basel	III	will	‘damage	developing	countries’”		(June	14,	2012)	The	
Financial	Times.	
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